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Abstract—The contemporary trend of increasing connectivi-
ty, interoperability and efficiency of technologies, which are 
used in organizations, also affected Industrial Control Sys-
tem (further only ICS). The recently isolated system is be-
coming more dependent on interconnection with external 
technologies. This leads to a formation of new vulnerabili-
ties, which are significant threats to ICS. For this reason, it 
is necessary to devote considerable effort to analyze vulner-
abilities. Neglecting of this area could lead to damage or 
unavailability of ICS services. The purpose of the article is 
to evaluate vulnerabilities related to individual elements of 
ICS. The fundamental question of the article is to find a 
true distribution of security risk related to ICS. 
Index Terms—Cyber security, Industrial Control System, 
Information and Communication Technologies, Vulnerabil-
ity. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ICS is part of Critical information infrastructure that is 
why every cyber-attack on these systems can be consid-
ered as a lethal attack, which can cause serious damage to 
the environment, population or financial sector. It can also 
have a serious impact on the functioning of the state. 
The aim of the article is to evaluate cyber threats in re-
lation to ICS. For this reason, there is a research involving 
analyzed data from a US database of vulnerabilities under 
the ICS-CERT. Depth vulnerability analysis of any sys-
tem is an integral part of increasing system resilience. 
This is particularly important in the case of Advanced 
Persistent Threat. 
ICS elements can be divided into three main layers: 
business, supervisors, control. The article focuses primari-
ly on an evaluation of vulnerabilities falling within the 
control and supervisory layer. The purpose of the article is 
to find out which of the analyzed layer represents greater 
security risk for ICS. 
II. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
ICS systems are developed for monitoring, manage-
ment and control of industrial systems. They are an im-
portant part of the critical information infrastructure, 
which penetrate into areas of transportation systems, pow-
er plants, dams, water treatment, oil production, chemi-
cals, gas distribution, etc. 
Industrial control systems have a positive influence on 
contemporary society. ICS is under increasing pressure to 
improve efficiency and interoperability. It resulted in the 
emergence of new vulnerabilities. As a consequence, the 
protected system becomes more vulnerable to new cyber-
attacks. 
Wide area of ICS can be divided into two main areas. 
The first of these is geographically independent Supervi-
sory Control and Data Acquisition (further only SCADA) 
system. The second group is classified as geographically 
dependent systems such as a Distributed Control System 
(further only DCS). A summary of the main differences 
between SCADA system and DCS is shown in the Tab. I. 
TABLE I.   
COMPARISON BETWEEN SCADA AND DSC [1] 
Description of sys-
tems 
SCADA DCS 
Orientation Data-gathering Process trends 
Geographical distri-
bution Global Local 
Obtaining the neces-
sary data 
Always con-
nected to data-
bases 
Always connected to 
I/O devices 
Purpose Coordination of infrastructures 
Control endpoint devic-
es 
Deployment of the 
system Centralized Decentralized 
A. Basic Operations 
Detailed specifications of ICS, is a relatively complex 
operation. For this reason, it is advisable to demonstrate 
basic operations of ICS in a simplified model. The model 
is shown in Fig. 1. 
All ICS operations are focused on controlling and mon-
itoring processes. The whole model can be divided into 
three main layers. The lowest layer of the entire system is 
focused on the physical manifestations of a controlled 
process. Actuators and sensors are used for monitoring 
and regulation. This layer is directly connected to a se-
cond layer. 
The second layer, also called as the control layer is fo-
cused on control of processes. It is important to say that 
programmable logic controllers (further only PLCs) are 
responsible for controlling processes. They receive real 
information about the controlled process from the sensors. 
PLCs based on their programs decide what to do and then 
give instructions to the actuators, which regulate the con-
trolled processes. 
The third layer of the entire ICS is focused on monitor-
ing and collection data relating to controlled processeses. 
This layer consists of Human-Machine Interface (further 
only HMI) and Remote Diagnostics and Maintenance. [2] 
The HMI represents a connection between the system and 
human operators. Human operators are responsible for 
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control, regulation and management of the controlled 
processes. Human operators also receive important infor-
mation about the current state from PLCs. The purpose of 
Remote Diagnostics and Maintenance is to identify ab-
normalities and implement prevention and revitalization 
measures. [2] 
 
Figure 1.  The basic operation of ICS [2] 
B. Architecture 
It is important to establish three basic layers (business, 
supervisory, control) for the correct specification of ICS 
architecture. Layers are further specified by their charac-
teristic features. The individual layers are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2.  ICS architecture layers [5] 
Each of the layers represents a hierarchical manage-
ment level of ICS. This chapter describes layers including 
the hardware components themselves. 
Security threats arising out of the inadequate implemen-
tation of cyber security measures could be misused for 
cyber-attacks. Various Attack Vectors are used for pene-
tration and distribution of the malicious code in ICS. For 
this reason, it is advisable and necessary to identify prima-
ry paths that are used for penetration into the system. 
Exploitation of vulnerabilities is the first step to penetrate 
and compromise the system, which may lead to the col-
lapse and loss of its functionality.  
1) Control Layer 
This is the lowest layer in the hierarchical management 
system ICS, which directly monitors and controls indus-
trial processes. There are used multiple sensors and actua-
tors. Furthermore, there is a Remote Terminal Unit (fur-
ther only RTU) and a Programmable Logic Controller. 
They are responsible for control and management of in-
dustrial processes based on its software. 
a) RTU 
Remote Telemetry unit is an electronic device used for 
controlling industrial processes. Its function is similar to a 
PLC. However, its usage is different. It is a Field Device, 
which is connected to wireless data transmission. That is 
why RTU is used where is not possible to use traditional 
wire solutions. 
b) PLC 
Programmable Logic Controller is an industrial com-
puter, which is responsible for local control and manage-
ment of industrial processes. PLCs receive feedback from 
sensors and then regulate the system through actuators. 
PLCs have a programmable memory used to store instruc-
tions and functions which define their behavior. 
c) Actuators and Sensors 
These electronic devices are classified as the lowest el-
ements in the hierarchical management system of ICS. 
Actuators and sensors are devices which have influence 
and also are influenced by controlled processes. Sensors 
detect industrial environment and thereafter inform Con-
troller (PLC, RTU). On the other hand Actuators works 
with inputs which are generated by Controllers.  
2) Supervisory Layer 
This layer is responsible for monitoring and supervising 
physical processes. This layer stores and uses important 
data. Human operators can manage the system via HMI. 
They use algorithms which modify the behavior of con-
trollers, thereby affecting physical processes. 
a) Data Historian 
Data Historian is a centralized database of historical da-
ta relating to the controlled processes. The data can be 
used for statistical analysis and evaluation. [2] 
b) Human Machine Interface 
HMI is the interface between human operators and the 
controlled system. It is an essential element of manage-
ment and control within the system. It informs operators 
about a current status of controlled processes. This co-
munication requires the necessary data from Data Acqui-
sition Server. HMI is also used to set up parameters which 
determine controller activities. 
c) Application Server 
Application Server is responsible for controlling and di-
recting data traffic within applications. Transform data 
into a correct format which are suitable for communica-
tion. It is also responsible for observance of data commu-
nication priorities. [2] 
d) Database Server 
Database Server is a standalone computer where the da-
tabase lies. The server provided database services to se-
lected applications which are critical to ICS. 
e) Data Acquisition Server 
Data Acquisition Server provides interconnection be-
tween services and Control Layer (mainly PLC and RTU). 
Received physical data from sensors are sent via a bus to 
the applications, which are based on the Internet Protocol 
(IP). This communication is provided by Data Acquisition 
Server, which allows users to remotely access.  
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f) Master Terminal Unit 
Master Terminal Unit (further only MTU) or the 
SCADA server is an element, which acts as a master in 
SCADA systems. On the other hand, elements such as 
RTU or PLC can be described as a slave. MTU receives 
data from the RTU / PLC which are further processed as 
desired. [2] 
3) Business Layer 
Business Layer is the highest layer in hierarchical man-
agement model. This layer using obtained data for a com-
pany itself. Especially for increasing profits, streamline 
marketing, and accounting, administrative and business 
support. Business Layer is the most dependent layer on 
connection to the Internet and also can be considered as 
the most open layer. That is why it is the first target for 
hackers in order to gain full control over ICS. [3] 
There are many topics related to Cyber Security in 
businesses however, a few are focused on control and 
supervisory systems. The article deals with the analysis of 
vulnerabilities falling within Supervisory Layer and Con-
trol Layer.  
C. Safety Instrumented System 
Safety Instrumented System (further only SIS) is de-
veloped and used in a close relationship with ICS. Its 
purpose is to enhance the protection of Critical Process 
Systems. [1] SIS is an integral part of the critical infor-
mation infrastructure therefore their failure could have a 
significant impact on citizens and the state. It is one of the 
examples where information technology can affect the 
physical world. 
SIS is focused on the prevention of crisis situations 
however it is not a part of ICS. This system is an ICS 
supplement. It is responsible for shutting down critical 
processes. The system is mainly composed of sensors, 
decision circuits, and control elements. SIS monitoring 
current state of processes while ensuring it does not ex-
ceed predetermined limits. [1]  
D. The Main Difference Between ICT and ICS Cyber 
Security 
There is one question that must be answered. What are 
the main differences between ICT and ICS cyber security? 
This problem is described by using basic security criteria: 
availability, confidentiality and integrity. Their relation-
ship to ICS and ICT are shown in Fig. 3. It follows that 
confidentiality is the most important for ICT. On the other 
hand, availability is the most important for ICS. That is 
why the most important threats for ICS are not so signifi-
cant for ICT.  
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of ICT and ICS cyber security [1] 
III. METHODS 
The purpose of the research is to evaluate the ICS vul-
nerabilities. The data was recovered from vulnerability 
database ICS-CERT for the period from 01. 2015 to 02. 
06. 2015. 
The data are an essential basis which is decisive for the 
statistical assessment of Supervisory and Control layer. 
There are analyzed approximately fifty vulnerabilities. 
The main question of the article is: “Which of the in-
vestigated hierarchical layers represents a greater threat in 
terms of cyber security. The question is examined accord-
ing to following criteria: number of reported vulnerabili-
ties, type of cyber-attacks, depending on vulnerabilities 
and their severity. In conclusion, there are two analyzes, 
which are focused on Exploitability Metrics and Impact 
Metrics. 
IV. RESULTS 
In order to evaluate the main objective of the research, 
it was necessary to specify the individual layers. Each of 
layers is divided into individual elements (shown in Fig. 
2). Research data are classified into predefined groups 
(shown in Fig. 4). The graph shows the distribution of 
vulnerabilities per layer and vulnerability related to indi-
vidual elements. 
We can say that the most vulnerable layer is Superviso-
ry with 64% of the total vulnerabilities, and the most vul-
nerable element is HMI with 36% of vulnerabilities. On 
the other hand, cannot omit Control Layer with 36% of 
vulnerabilities, and the most vulnerable element PLC with 
18% of vulnerabilities. 
 
Figure 4.  The distribution of vulnerabilities [5] 
The second objective of the research is to describe the 
possible consequences of identified vulnerabilities. The 
distribution of impacts is shown in Fig. 5, where are the 
individual impacts divided into separate layers. 
The result of this investigation demonstrates that the 
most common impacts on the supervisory layer are Obtain 
Information with 13% of vulnerabilities and Gain Privi-
leges with 13% of vulnerabilities. It can, therefore, be 
established that this layer is very vulnerable to privilege 
escalation, which allows an attacker to break into a secure 
system. The Control Layer is the most affected by Denial 
of Service (further only DoS) with 17% of vulnerabilities 
and Gain Privileges 11%. 
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Figure 5.  The distribution of impacts [5] 
The third objective of the research is concerned with 
the severity of vulnerabilities. To this end, we use stand-
ard vulnerability assessment: Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (further only CVSS) version 2. Vulnera-
bilities are evaluated by six CVSS metrics, which are used 
for the research (shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8). Every single 
vulnerability is categorized on scale of 0 to 10. The least 
significant vulnerability is represented by 0. However, the 
most significant vulnerability is represented by 10. There 
are five intervals for every layer. These intervals are es-
tablished for vulnerabilities according to CVSS. [4] 
As it has already explained, the largest number of vul-
nerabilities falls within Supervisors Layer. However, in 
Fig. 6 we can see that Supervisory Layer also excels in 
severity and hazard, which are arising from vulnerabili-
ties. 
 
Figure 6.  The distribution of vulnerabilities severity [5] 
There are two figures (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8) which repre-
senting six metrics used to calculate CVSSv2. These are 
the following areas: Access Complexity, Access Vector, 
Authentication, Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. 
These metrics are divided into two main groups: Exploit-
ability Metrics and Impact Metrics.[4] Exploitability Met-
rics are used in Fig. 7 for analyzing vulnerabilities. Ex-
ploitability Metrics are divided into three subgroups: Ac-
cess Complexity, Access Vector and Authentication. [4] 
They are used for defining and evaluating vulnerability 
according to strictly defined criteria. 
Access Complexity metric describes the degree of the 
special conditions that must occur in order to exploit the 
vulnerability. [4] For this reason, Access Complexity is 
divided into three areas according to the level of initial 
conditions. The analyzed data show that a considerable 
part of vulnerabilities (55% of Access Complexity cases) 
do not need to abuse other special conditions (shown in 
Fig. 7). 
The purpose of Access Vector is to evaluate what ap-
proach attacker must achieve to exploit vulnerabilities. 
The metric is divided into three areas. Attacker must have 
local access to exploit vulnerability (Local). An attacker 
must have access to networks in which there is a system 
with vulnerability (Adjacent Network) or may not have 
physical access to the LAN (Network), which leads to 
remote abuse. [4] The results of investigation show that 
the largest number of analyzed vulnerabilities can be 
remotely exploited (59% of Access Vector cases). 
Authentication is the third metric which is used for the 
research. Vulnerabilities are divided according to whether 
they need  perform authentication once, several times or 
not needed to carry out which is the basic assumption for 
their misuse. [4] The largest group of analyzed vulnerabil-
ities can be exploited without authentication to 84%. 
 
Figure 7.  The distribution of Exploitability Metrics [5] 
The final part of the article is focused on the specifica-
tion of ICS impacts based on the analyzed data. This issue 
describes the group of metrics known as Impact Metrics. 
The impacts are divided into three subgroups that repre-
sent different metrics: Integrity, Confidentiality, Availa-
bility.[4] Each vulnerability is defined within individual 
metric. Each metric is represented by one of these values: 
none, partial or full impact on the integrity, confidentiality 
or availability. 
The evaluated data shows that vulnerabilities have the 
largest impact on Availability. It may cause complete loss 
(51% of all vulnerabilities) of system availability. This 
movement should be also seen in other Impact Metrics, 
which are confidentiality (43% of all vulnerabilities) and 
integrity (45% of all vulnerabilities). 
 
Figure 8.  The distribution of Impact Metrics [5] 
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V. CONSLUSION 
The purpose of the article is to evaluate the vulnerabil-
ity in relation to ICS. It is therefore necessary to set the 
objectives that are subsequently examined. The assess-
ment of the vulnerabilities is performed according to dif-
ferent perspectives. 
Research indicates that Supervisory Layer is more vul-
nerable than Control Layer. It can be demonstrated on 
number and severity of vulnerabilities. These can be ex-
ploited which leads to penetration into the system. How-
ever, it is important to warn about a high number of vul-
nerability, which may lead to DoS which cause a serious 
threat to the availability of services. It is the most im-
portant safety criterion for ICS. This opinion is enhanced 
by the fact arising from the Impact Metrics analysis. It is 
noticeable that the analyzed vulnerabilities have the great-
est impact on availability. This is even more enhanced by 
the fact that most of the analyzed vulnerabilities can be 
remotely exploited and do not need any authentication. 
ICS cyber-attacks will become a more serious threat to 
the population and the countries themselves. For this rea-
son, it is logical and effective to prevent them. It can part-
ly be achieved by thorough analysis of vulnerabilities. 
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